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Abstract 
Based on a data set of 115 economies, this paper empirically investigates the relation 
between public debt and economic growth. Using the World Bank’s classification for 
income groups, we initially find that those countries that present the lowest public debt 
are characterized by the highest economic growth, while the smallest growth rates are 
associated with the highest public debt. Nevertheless, this conclusion is tempered when 
we analyse the countries by income level: low-income countries have a different 
behaviour with respect to lower-middle, upper-middle and high income countries. When 
using the IMF’s country classification, the results do not suggest a clear pattern in the 
public debt-economic growth nexus across different countries, but indicate a 
heterogeneous relationship between such key macroeconomic variables. 
 
JEL classification numbers: C32, H63, O40, O57. 
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I. Introduction 
 
Over the last two decades, considerable attention has been devoted to role of public debt 
in economic growth and, although there is a large body of theoretical and empirical 
literature devoted to this issue, the result are far from conclusive [see Panizza and 
Presbitero (2013) for a survey]. 
 
According to the conventional perspective, the increase of public debt to finance 
government deficit can stimulate aggregate demand and economic performance in the 
short-term, although when there is not a strict control of debt accumulation it could be 
possible to experience capital outflows and important output reduction in the long-term 
(Elmendorf and Mankiw, 1999). Some authors contend that in crisis periods, debt-
financed expansionary fiscal policies should be implemented to maintain welfare and 
promote economic growth [see for instance, Krugman (2011) or DeLong and Summers 
(2012)]. On the contrary, authors as Cochrane (2011) or Reinhart and Rogoff (2010), 
among others, indicate that higher levels of public debt reduce significantly the 
economic performance and for this reason, austerity policies should be preferred to 
guarantee the confidence of economic agents and to improve their expectations. Indeed, 
few macroeconomic policy debates have generated as much controversy as the current 
austerity argument [see Alesina and Ardagna (2010), Alesina et al. (2015), Guajardo et 
al. (2014) or Jordà and Taylor (2016)] and, as Europe stagnates, the polemic appears to 
be far from over.  
 
The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the literature by performing a fresh and 
comprehensive assessment of this hypothesis in a large cross-section of countries over a 
long sample. The key questions that guide our analysis are: (i) is economic growth 
affected by the level of public debt? and (ii) does it depend upon the income level? 
Answers to these questions seem relevant as they have direct implications for policy 
makers and academic researchers.  
 
The paper is organised as follows. Section II briefly reviews the empirical literature on 
public debt and economic growth. Section III details the data. Section IV describes the 
empirical strategy and reports the results. Section V offers some concluding remarks. 
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II. Literature Review 
 
The conventional view is that while debt can stimulate aggregate demand and output in 
the short run [see Barro (1990) or Elmendorf and Mankiw (1999)], it may crowd out 
capital and reduce output in the long run (Diamond, 1965; Modigliani, 1961; Salotti and 
Trecoci, 2016). Moreover, the literature provides different reasons to explain why the 
negative effects of public debt are likely to increase, the higher the public debt level is. 
Gale and Orzag (2003) and Baldacci and Kumar (2010) argue that high public debt can 
adversely affect capital accumulation and growth via higher long-term interest rates. 
Barro (1979) and Dotsey (1994) points out the role played by higher future distortionary 
taxation. Sargent and Wallace (1981), Cochrane (2011) and Barro (2013) emphasize the 
significant negative effect of debt-induced inflation on economic growth. Nevertheless, 
some endogenous growth models show that a positive impact may be possible in the 
short-run, depending on the type of public goods financed out of debt (Aizenman et 
al.,2007) or up to certain limits when debt is used to finance productive public capital 
(Aschauer, 2000). 
 
Focusing on empirical studies there is still no consensus on the relationship between 
these two variables. Using a lag distributional model on nine Latin American countries 
over twelve years, Geiger (1990) finds that debt burden implies an important reduction 
on economic growth. Considering different exchange rate arrangement, political 
systems, institutions and historic contexts, Reinhart and Rogoff (2010 and 2011) study 
one of the most enlarged database including forty-four countries over two hundred 
years. Focusing directly on total public debt (domestic and external), they identify a 
weak relationship between gross central government debt and real Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) growth when debt is below 90 percent of GDP, nevertheless once it 
exceeds this threshold1 economic growth slows significantly. In fact, above this 
threshold, the median economic growth decreases by one percent and the average 
economic growth falls almost four percent with respect to the lower burden groups. 
When they focus on external debt (public plus private debt), their results suggest that 
above 60 percent of GDP, annual economic growth reduces almost two percent and for 
higher levels of debt growth rates diminish approximately in half. In the same vein, 
                                                 
1 The threshold used by them for public debt in advanced and emerging economies is similar. 
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Caner et al. (2010) obtain a similar non-linearity effect on growth, since they state that 
above 77 percent of GDP additional debt affects negatively output growth, however for 
moderate levels of public debt contribute to increase investment and get faster economic 
growth. Cecchetti et al. (2011) examine the impact of debt on economic growth using 
data for 18 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
countries from 1980 to 2010. Their results support the view that, beyond the 85% of 
GDP, public debt is bad for growth.  
 
Authors as Rangarajan and Srivastava (2005) or Kannan and Singh (2007) reveal a long 
run relationship between these two variables and to be more specific using Johansen 
cointegration techniques identify some adverse effects in the case of high levels of 
public debt. Applying the autoregressive distributed lag model and the error correction 
model in India during 1980 to 2010, Bal and Rath (2014) illustrate that government debt 
affects negatively to economic growth in the short and also in the long term. Ismihan 
and Ozkan (2012) study how financial development can influence on the 
macroeconomic outcomes. They detect that the lower the financial development, more 
relevant will be the unfavorable effects of public debt on the economy. Qureshi and Ali 
(2010) empirically explored the impact of high public debt burden on the economy of 
Pakistan. The sample of the study was 1981 to 2008. From their study a vast negative 
impact of public debt on the economy of Pakistan had been found by the authors. 
 
Presbitero (2012) detects a different behavior for developing countries. In this case, 
higher public debt implies lower economic growth up to a threshold of 90 percent of 
GDP, however from this magnitude it has not effect on the dependent variable [a similar 
conclusion arises in Cordella et al. (2010) with external debt]. This non-linear effect is 
explained by the author by country-specific factors, because the highest level of debt 
should be related to sound macroeconomic policies and confident and stable 
institutional framework. On the contrary, Abbas and Christensen (2010) using a panel 
data of low-income and emerging countries, describe a positive contribution to 
economic growth when domestic debt presents moderate levels, nevertheless once 
represents more than 35 percent of bank deposits has a negative impact on growth due 
to inflationary pressures and the crowding out of private sector.  
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Instead of applying a descriptive analysis as in Reinhart and Rogoff (2010 and 2011), 
Égert (2015) uses nonlinear threshold models based on a similar database to identify the 
debt threshold beyond which negative effects for economic growth start to appear. This 
paper highlights that nonlinear effects are very sensitive to data frequency, time and 
country dimension and other assumptions. The formal econometric test shows that the 
threshold can be lower than 90 percent, even between 20 and 60 percent of GDP. In 
fact, these results are maintained when it is used a multivariate model including 
traditional explanatory factors of long-term economic growth in a context of 
uncertainty.  
 
Applying a dynamic threshold model for the debt-growth nexus, Baum, Checherita-
Westphal and Rother (2013) study the short-term impact of debt on the economic 
growth in 12 euro area economies during 1990 to 2010. They identify a positive effect 
below 67% and above 95%, showing a negative consequence on the economic activity. 
Minea and Parent (2012) implement some endogeneous thresholds estimation 
techniques and obtain a similar result: at lower levels of debt, an increase in the deficit 
spending can generate an increment in the economic performance, nevertheless at 
higher levels can reduce the economic growth substantially. 
 
Trying to avoid the problem of endogeneity, since it is possible to have a bi-directional 
causality between these two variables, Kumar and Woo (2015) achieve a linear 
relationship for 38 advanced and emerging countries for a much shorter time horizon, 
showing that when public debt increase in a 10 percent the annual per capita real GDP 
growth experiments a fall of 0.2 percentage points. In the same line, Schclarek (2005) 
shows no evidence of an inverted U-shape in 59 developing countries for more than 30 
years, however finds that foreign debt accumulation decreases per capita output growth 
in a linear way. Similar results have been reached when a panel of 152 developing 
economies over the period 1977-2002 is analyzed in Presbitero (2005). Although debt 
service is not significant across any specification in this paper, debt stock indicators are 
always significant displaying an adverse impact on economic growth. In fact, the 
negative effect ranges between 1.02 to 1.50 for the deb-to-GDP ratio using different 
specifications. On average, an increase of 10 percent of external debt reduces economic 
growth by 0.11. This effect is stronger in low-income countries. The transmission 
channels through which this author justifies the negative linear relationship between 
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external debt and economic performance is the liquidity constraint, the macroeconomic 
instability due to uncertainty, lower efficiency of investment and its effect on 
macroeconomic policies and institutional development. A similar argument is used by 
Pattillo et al. (2011) to explain how high levels of external debt diminish economic 
growth along different robust econometric methodologies since instead of reducing the 
investment volume it goes down the efficiency of it.  
 
Chudik et al. (2013) examine the long-term effects of public debt on growth employing 
a cross-sectionally augmented distributed lag methodology. These authors emphasize 
that the results would depend whether the increase of debt is permanent or temporary (to 
smooth out business cycle fluctuations), since only if it is permanent it will notice the 
negative impact on growth in the long-term. They indicate that after periods 
characterized by high levels of debt, it is possible to implement a fiscal policy 
compatible with Keynesian deficit spending, but it must be accompanied by credible 
announcements of reducing the debt burden to levels considered as normal. One of the 
main limitations of this paper is the absence of a specific estimation of this turning point 
in which there is no credible expectations of a reversal in the debt pattern.  
 
Most of the authors focus mainly on the impact of indebtedness on economic growth, 
disregarding the possibility of a reverse causality running from growth to debt. To fill 
this gap in the literature, some papers have studied the causal relationship between these 
two variables. However, there is currently no consensus among economist in this area. 
For instance, Ferreira (2009) find a bi-directional causal relationship between public 
debt and growth when analyze 20 countries members of the OECD during thirteen 
years. Applying a different methodology (instrumental approach), Panizza and 
Presbitero (2014) do not detect a causal connection.  In the same line, Puente-Ajovín 
and Sanso-Navarro (2015) show that government debt does not cause real GDP growth 
using a panel bootstrap Granger causality test in 16 OECD countries from 1980 to 2009. 
In contrast, their paper supports the idea that non-financial private debt affect to real 
economic performance. More recently, examining eleven peripheral and central EMU 
countries, Gómez-Puig and Sosvilla-Rivero (2015) confirm that there is not a negative 
causation between sovereign debt and economic growth when they consider the whole 
sample period (1980-2013). Nevertheless, they find an inverse Granger-causality 
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relationship from 2007 or 20092 to the end of the period above a debt threshold that 
ranges from 56 to 103%. This paper suggests that an increase in public indebtedness 
would reduce economic growth. 
 
As can be seen from this concise literature review, the theoretical models provide 
ambiguous results and rather than many papers have found a negative correlation 
between public debt and economic growth in the long-run for advanced countries, 
Panizza and Presbitero (2013) claim that is not a robust result because small changes in 
data or in the econometric methods yield different results with respect to the causal 
relationship between these two variables. These authors emphasize the relevance of the 
definition of public debt and the role of cross-country heterogeneity. For this reason the 
purpose of this paper is to contribute to the literature by performing a fresh and 
comprehensive assessment of this hypothesis in a large cross-section of countries over a 
long sample. 
 
III. Data 
 
We use data for a total of 115 countries, both developed and developing countries over 
an extended period of time (1970-2013). The 115 countries are: Algeria, Argentina, 
Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, 
Belgium, Belize, Bhutan, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, 
Central African Republic, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo Democratic Republic, Costa 
Rica, Cote d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, 
Ecuador, Egypt Arab Republic, El Salvador, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, 
Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Honduras, Hong Kong 
SAR, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, 
Kazakhstan, Kenya, Korea Democratic Republic, Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, Lesotho, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Maldives, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Moldova, 
Mongolia, Morocco, Myanmar, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, 
Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Romania, 
Russian Federation, San Marino, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovak 
Republic, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Sweden, 
                                                 
2 These breakpoints are identified endogenously. 
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Switzerland, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United 
Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
 
To assess real economic growth, we make use of the annual percentage change rate of 
the GDP at market prices expressed in constant US$2005 taking from the World Bank 
National Accounts and OECD National Accounts data.  
 
IV. Empirical Strategy and Results 
 
IV.1 Empirical strategy 
Our approach is decidedly empirical, taking advantage of a broad dataset on public debt 
and economic growth. We form groups of countries at the end of each year based on 
total (domestic plus external) gross central government debt as a share of GDP taking 
from Reinhart and Rogoff (2011) and from Datastream.  
 
In order to create our debt classification we adopt the following procedure. First, we 
calculate the percentiles 25, 50 and 75 for our distribution. Then we apply the following 
criteria: if the total gross central government debt is less or equal than percentile 25 we 
categorize this country as low debt group, if the total of indebtedness is between 
percentile 25 and percentile 50 will be considered as lower-middle debt group, if the 
central debt is between percentile 50 and percentile 75 is upper-middle debt group and 
finally if it exceeds percentile 75 we assign it on high debt group. 
 
Starting in 1970, we recursively form groups of countries based on the debt 
classification and we track their growth performance. The dynamic rebalancing of 
country groups enables us to look at the average growth performance of groups of 
countries with similar level of indebtedness.  
 
This procedure circumvents the need to assume a specific channel through which public 
debt might influence growth. Additionally, this approach produces results which are 
readily interpretable in terms of economic significance, since the difference in growth 
differentials between groups directly yields an estimate of how much higher the rate of 
growth is in countries with a given level of indebtedness versus countries with an 
alternative one. 
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IV.II Empirical results 
We considered four statistics to evaluate the economic growth performance of each 
group of countries: the mean, the median, the 20% trimmed mean and the 20% 
winsorized mean. 
 
Table 1 (Panel A) presents the results. As can be seen, those countries that present the 
lowest public debt are characterized by the highest economic growth, while the smallest 
growth rates are associated with the highest public debt. In order to investigate the 
existence of means equality between different debt groups, first it has been implemented 
several variance equality test in which the null hypothesis contrast what is called 
homogeneity of variance (see for instance, Levene, Brown-Forsythe, Bartlett test, 
among others). Depending on whether we can reject or not the null hypothesis of 
variance equality, Table 1 presents the results of Welch F-test or ANOVA F-test, 
respectively. These formal tests of mean equality indicate that there are indeed 
significant differences between low and high debt groups in terms of economic growth. 
Regardless of the method used, those countries with the highest level of debt show 
almost one percent less in its economic growth rate. Additionally, our results also 
suggest significant differences between lower-middle and high debt countries and 
between upper-middle and high debt countries, but not between lower-middle and 
upper-middle countries. 
 
To assess the robustness of our results, we divide economies under study in four income 
groups using the World Bank’s classification: low income, lower middle income, upper 
middle income and high income. Given that income classifications are set each year 
based on their per capita income data, we recursively formed groups of countries based 
on the public debt and income classifications, tracking their growth performance. In this 
case, we need to clarify that we calculate different percentiles 25, 50 and 75 for each 
income countries groups in order to get a more accurate debt classification. Panels B to 
E in Table 1 report the results. It can be seen that low-income countries have a different 
behaviour with respect to lower-middle, upper-middle and high income countries. 
Except for the case of upper middle versus high debt, clearly we can reject the null 
hypothesis of formal mean equality tests regardless of whether we use mean, median, 
winsorized mean or trimmed mean. As the level of debt increases the economic growth 
experiences a progressively decrease. Comparing our four statistics we can say that the 
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highest debt group is associated with the lowest economic growth (around 3% of the 
GDP), while the upper-middle debt group almost reaches a 4%. It is possible to obtain a 
higher level of output for lower-middle debt group and even higher for countries that try 
to avoid excessive budget deficits. Analyzing lower-middle-income countries, there are 
only significant statistical differences between low and high debt indicating that 
austerity policies suppose higher output. Nevertheless, for upper-middle-income and 
high-income countries it cannot be appreciated any differences in terms of growth 
studying different level of indebtedness. 
 
Our results suggest that the level of debt accumulation specially matters for low and 
lower-middle-income countries due to the fact that higher levels of debt imply lower 
economic growth. For this reason, it must have a very strict control of indebtedness 
since there are significant differences between low and high debt groups. However, for 
upper-middle-income and high-income countries it seems that economic growth is not 
affected by the level of debt. 
 
IV.III Further empirical results 
In order to gain further insights into the relation between public debt and economic 
growth and to obtain additional evidence on the robustness of our results, we divide 
economies under study according to the International Monetary Fund (IMF)’s country 
classifications. As before, we recursively formed groups of countries based on the 
public debt and income classifications, tracking their growth performance. 
 
Table 2 reports the results for the IMF’s coarse classification: advanced countries, 
developing countries and countries in transition. Interestingly, for the advanced 
economies (Panel A in Table 2) there is not a significant different pattern in growth 
behaviour between the four groups of level of debt. Regarding the developing countries, 
results in Panel B of Table 2 suggest a negative and significant relationship between 
economic growth and the level of public debt.  Finally, with respect to the countries in 
transition (Panel C in Table 2), we observe that, with the exception of the lower middle 
debt group, the higher the public debt, the lower the rate of economic growth. 
Nevertheless, the only statistical difference in performance between groups is that for 
upper-middle debt and high debt countries.  
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In Table 3, we show the results for the IMF’s fine classification: European Union 
countries, newly industrialized Asian countries, other advanced economies, Sub-Sahara 
countries, North Africa countries, Asian developing countries, Middle East and Europe 
countries, Western Hemisphere developing countries, Central and Eastern Europe 
countries and Transcaucasus and Central Asia countries. As can be seen in Panel A of 
Table 3, in the case of the European Union countries there is not a statistically 
significant difference in the relationship of public debt and economic growth between 
the four groups of level of debt. As for the newly industrialized Asian countries (Panel 
B in Table 3), the highest growth rates are associated with upper middle levels of public 
debt, being the difference with the low debt level statistically significant. Regarding, the 
other advanced economies (Panel C in Table 3), there are statistically significant 
differences in the growth performance between the low and lower middle debt levels, 
between the lower middle and high debt levels, and between the upper middle and high 
debt levels, being the highest growth rates associated with lower middle debt countries. 
Turning to the case of the developing countries, results in Panel D of Table 3 suggest 
that there is not any statistically significant pattern relating public debt and economic 
growth for the Sub-Sahara countries, while for the North Africa countries (Panel E in 
Table 3), we detect a statistically significant difference in the growth performance 
between the low and lower middle debt levels, presenting the latter higher growth rates. 
In respect to the Asian developing countries (Panel F in Table 3), we do find 
statistically significant differences in growth rates between the debt groups, the highest 
growth rates being associated with the lowest debt countries. Regarding the Middle East 
and Europe countries (Panel G in Table 3), we observe a statistically significant 
difference in the growth behaviour between the low and high debt levels and between 
the lower middle and high debt levels, being the highest growth rates associated with 
high debt countries. In relation to the Western Hemisphere developing countries (Panel 
H in Table 3), we identify statistically significant differences in economic growth 
between the low and high debt levels, the lower middle and high debt levels and 
between upper middle and high debt, showing that the higher the public debt, the lower 
the economic growth rate. Finally, referring to countries in transition, neither for the 
Central and Eastern Europe countries (Panel I in Table 3) nor for the Transcaucasus and 
Central Asia countries (Panel J in Table 3) we find evidence of statistically significant 
differences in growth rates between the debt groups. 
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V. Concluding remarks 
 
This paper tried to contribute to the previous literature by providing a comprehensive 
characterization of the relation between public debt and economic growth and offering a 
guide to regulators and policy makers further empirical evidence to assess under what 
conditions is debt growth-enhancing. To that end, we empirically investigated the 
relation between public debt and economic growth using annual data for 115 economies 
covering the period 1970-2013, searching for a systemic relationship between these two 
variables. 
 
Using the World Bank’s classification for income groups, our results initially indicate 
that those countries that present the lowest public debt are characterized by the highest 
economic growth, while the smallest growth rates are associated with the highest public 
debt. This result is consistent with higher debt ratios being associated on average, with 
lower GDP growth rates (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2010). Nevertheless, this conclusion is 
tempered when we analyse the countries by income level: low-income countries have a 
different behaviour with respect to lower-middle, upper-middle and high income 
countries. 
 
When using the IMF’s country classification, the results do not suggest a clear pattern in 
the debt-growth nexus across different countries, but indicate a heterogeneous 
relationship between such key macroeconomic variables. Therefore, our results lend 
support to the view that debt overhang effects cannot be related to a specific debt 
threshold and that the relationship between public debt and growth is complex.  
 
A natural extension to the analysis presented in this paper would be to explore the main 
determinants of the detected differences in the relationships between public debt and 
economic growth across countries, with special emphasis in the institutional factors as 
suggested by Hall and Jones (1999), Acemoglu (2009) and Acemoglu and Robinson 
(2012).  This is an item in our future research agenda. 
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Table 1: Empirical results using the World Bank’s classification 
 Mean Median Winsorised 
mean 
Trimmed 
mean 
Panel A: All countries 
Low debt 4.0617 
(15.9072) 
3.9340 
(16.7370) 
4.0040 
(16.1417) 
3.9684 
(16.4490) 
Lower middle debt 3.7831 
(12.7679) 
3.9852 
(13.8740) 
3.9337 
(14.7046) 
3.9384 
(14.4672) 
Upper middle debt 3.6669 
(15.0041) 
3.6103 
(17.7815) 
3.6700 
(17.8155) 
3.6842 
(18.6549) 
High debt 2.8717 
(9.2848) 
3.0970 
(10.0438) 
3.0387 
(10.9862) 
3.0623 
(10.7929) 
Low vs Lower middle 
debt 
0.5072 
[0.4783] 
0.0190 
[0.8906] 
0.0371 
[0.8477] 
0.0068 
[0.9345] 
Low vs Upper middle 
debt 
1.2478 
[0.2672] 
1.0859 
[0.3004] 
1.0727 
[0.3033] 
0.8311 
[0.3646] 
Low vs High debt 8.8030* 
[0.0039] 
4.6605** 
[0.0337] 
6.7504* 
[0.0111] 
5.9189** 
[0.0171] 
Lower middle vs 
Upper middle debt 
0.0916 
[0.7629] 
1.1356 
[0.2896] 
0.6099 
[0.4370] 
0.5714 
[0.4518] 
Lower middle vs High 
debt 
4.5278** 
[0.0363] 
4.4423** 
[0.0380] 
5.4102** 
[0.0224] 
4.9642** 
[0.0285] 
Upper middle vs High 
debt 
4.0690** 
[0.0469] 
1.9334 
[0.1686] 
3.3511*** 
[0.0710] 
3.2359*** 
[0.0761] 
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Table 1 (continued) 
 Mean Median Winsorised 
mean 
Trimmed 
mean 
Panel B: Low-income countries 
Low debt 6.2576 
(10.3822) 
6.3390 
(10.4411) 
6.3487 
(10.4939) 
6.3471 
(10.4871) 
Lower middle debt 5.0251 
(10.6811) 
4.9141 
(14.1079) 
4.9509 
(13.7923) 
4.9463 
(13.9260) 
Upper middle debt 3.3178 
(7.8511) 
3.8450 
(9.9427) 
3.7390 
(9.3380) 
3.7572 
(9.4617) 
High debt 2.6122 
(5.6908) 
3.1638 
(7.4990) 
2.9775 
(6.5574) 
3.0113 
(7.1739) 
Low vs Lower middle 
debt   
2.5819 
[0.1121] 
4.1447** 
[0.0465] 
3.9485** 
[0.0511] 
3.9845** 
[0.0501] 
Low vs Upper middle 
debt   
15.9494* 
[0.0001] 
12.0050* 
[0.0009] 
12.9397* 
[0.0006] 
12.8012* 
[0.0006] 
Low vs High debt  23.4250* 
[0.0000] 
18.7384* 
[0.0000] 
21.2355* 
[0.0000] 
20.8397* 
[0.0000] 
Lower middle vs 
Upper middle debt  
7.3058* 
[0.0084] 
4.2071** 
[0.0436] 
5.0634** 
[0.0272] 
4.9665** 
[0.0287] 
Lower middle vs High 
debt  
13.4638* 
[0.0004] 
10.0675* 
[0.0021] 
12.5258* 
[0.0007] 
12.2034* 
[0.0008] 
Upper middle vs High 
debt  
1.2723 
[0.2626] 
1.4089 
[0.2387] 
1.7142 
[0.1941] 
1.6599 
[0.2012] 
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Table 1 (continued) 
 Mean Median Winsorised 
mean 
Trimmed 
mean 
Panel C: Lower-middle-income countries 
Low debt 4.4990 
(11.8179) 
4.8496 
(14.0197) 
4.5375 
(12.3577) 
4.5948 
(12.9212) 
Lower middle debt 4.1543 
(9.6880) 
4.2840 
(11.0099) 
4.3496 
(11.2192) 
4.3477 
(11.3688) 
Upper middle debt 4.0078 
(13.0037) 
3.9830 
(14.4720) 
3.9924 
(14.2144) 
4.0131 
(14.6345) 
High debt 3.3051 
(7.7630) 
3.6240 
(10.9768) 
3.3843 
(9.3771) 
3.4387 
(9.7707) 
Low vs Lower middle 
debt  
0.3604 
[0.5499] 
1.1764 
[0.2812] 
0.1235 
[0.7261] 
0.2235 
[0.6376] 
Low vs Upper middle 
debt  
1.0103 
[0.3178] 
3.8627** 
[0.0527] 
1.3983 
[0.2404] 
1.6876 
[0.1975] 
Low vs High debt  4.3572** 
[0.0399] 
6.5750* 
[0.0121] 
4.9901** 
[0.0282] 
5.3392** 
[0.0233] 
Lower middle vs 
Upper middle debt 
0.0769 
[0.7823] 
0.3989 
[0.5294] 
0.5567 
[0.4579] 
0.5054 
[0.4793] 
Lower middle vs High 
debt  
1.9753 
[0.1636] 
1.6732 
[0.1994] 
3.3048*** 
[0.0726] 
3.0587*** 
[0.0840] 
Upper middle vs High 
debt  
1.7877 
[0.1852] 
0.6978 
[0.4059] 
1.7564 
[0.1887] 
1.6575 
[0.2015] 
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Table 1 (continued) 
 Mean Median Winsorised 
mean 
Trimmed 
mean 
Panel D: Upper-middle-income countries 
Low debt 3.3495 
(8.8814) 
3.4235 
(8.8633) 
3.4260 
(8.7585) 
3.4266 
(8.7801) 
Lower middle debt 3.5622 
(6.7276) 
3.6840 
(7.3535) 
3.6656 
(7.3170) 
3.6691 
(7.3328) 
Upper middle debt 4.0046 
(7.6995) 
4.0141 
(7.7654) 
4.0371 
(7.7877) 
4.0348 
(7.7975) 
High debt 3.3774 
(5.7529) 
3.3504 
(5.7303) 
3.3679 
(5.7387) 
3.3651 
(5.7385) 
Low vs Lower middle 
debt  
0.1079 
[0.7434] 
0.1705 
[0.6807] 
0.1428 
[0.7064] 
0.1469 
[0.7025] 
Low vs Upper middle 
debt  
1.0397 
[0.3108] 
0.8374 
[0.3628] 
0.8854 
[0.3494] 
0.8807 
[0.3507] 
Low vs High debt  0.0016 
[0.9682] 
0.01088 
[0.9172] 
0.0068 
[0.9345] 
0.0076 
[0.9307] 
Lower middle vs 
Upper middle debt  
0.3553 
[0.5527] 
0.2100 
[0.6480] 
0.2653 
[0.6079] 
0.2578 
[0.6130] 
Lower middle vs High 
debt   
0.0545 
[0.8160] 
0.1870 
[0.6666] 
0.1483 
[0.7012] 
0.1549 
[0.6949] 
Upper middle vs High 
debt   
0.6394 
[0.4262] 
0.7231 
[0.3976] 
0.7305 
[0.3952] 
0.7332 
[0.3943] 
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Table 1 (continued) 
 Mean Median Winsorised 
mean 
Trimmed 
mean 
Panel E: High-income countries 
Low debt 2.8562 
(12.1182) 
2.7196 
(11.9641) 
2.7343 
(12.5503) 
2.7333 
(12.5634) 
Lower middle debt 3.0625 
(7.5634) 
2.9433 
(8.3672) 
3.0962 
(8.4797) 
3.0599 
(8.4628) 
Upper middle debt 3.0457 
(9.6128) 
2.8831 
(10.8494) 
2.8902 
(10.5921) 
2.8879 
(10.6575) 
High debt 3.5444 
(8.5501) 
3.0287 
(7.4922) 
3.1855 
(7.8805) 
3.1533 
(7.8365) 
Low vs Lower middle 
debt   
0.1939 
[0.6611] 
0.2853 
[0.5946] 
0.7242 
[0.3972] 
0.5988 
[0.4412] 
Low vs Upper middle 
debt   
0.2303 
[0.6325] 
0.2187 
[0.6412] 
0.1992 
[0.6565] 
0.1978 
[0.6577] 
Low vs High debt   2.0832 
[0.1536] 
0.4444 
[0.5069] 
0.9651 
[0.3296] 
0.8428 
[0.3620] 
Lower middle vs 
Upper middle debt  
0.0011 
[0.9740] 
0.0186 
[0.8917] 
0.2042 
[0.6525] 
0.1449 
[0.7044] 
Lower middle vs High 
debt   
0.6918 
[0.4079] 
0.0254 
[0.8737] 
0.0269 
[0.8702] 
0.0298 
[0.8633] 
Upper middle vs High 
debt   
0.9138 
[0.3418] 
0.0906 
[0.7642] 
0.3666 
[0.5465] 
0.2993 
[0.5858] 
Notes:  
In the ordinary brackets below the parameter estimates are the corresponding t-statistics 
based on Newey and West (1987) standard errors. 
XX vs. XX are equality tests. In the square brackets we report the associated p-values are 
given. *, ** and ***indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
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Table 2: Empirical results combining the World Bank’s classification with the 
IMF’s coarse classification  
 Mean Median Winsorised 
mean 
Trimmed 
mean 
Panel A: Advanced countries 
Low debt 2.8702 
(10.7602) 
2.8111 
(11.2200) 
2.8014 
(10.8577) 
2.8050 
(10.9160) 
Lower middle debt 3.2607 
(7.7230) 
3.0749 
(8.5569) 
3.1985 
(8.4961) 
3.1725 
(8.5540) 
Upper middle debt 3.1266 
(9.4734) 
3.0011 
(10.8134) 
2.9781 
(9.7400) 
2.9844 
(9.9896) 
High debt 3.4355 
(10.0170) 
3.0056 
(10.0166) 
3.0633 
(9.8967) 
3.0515 
(9.9530) 
Low vs Lower middle 
debt   
0.6116 
[0.4368] 
0.3655 
[0.5471] 
0.7630 
[0.3849] 
0.6688 
[0.4158] 
Low vs Upper middle 
debt   
0.3668 
[0.5463] 
0.2589 
[0.6122] 
0.1957 
[0.6594] 
0.2080 
[0.6495] 
Low vs High debt  1.7111 
[0.1944] 
0.2495 
[0.6188] 
0.4255 
[0.5160] 
0.3825 
[0.5379] 
Lower middle vs 
Upper middle debt  
0.0626 
[0.8030] 
0.0264 
[0.8713] 
0.2065 
[0.6507] 
0.1560 
[0.6939] 
Lower middle vs High 
debt  
0.1027 
[0.7488] 
0.0218 
[0.8830] 
0.0765 
[0.7827] 
0.0629 
[0.8026] 
Upper middle vs High 
debt  
0.4215 
[0.5180] 
0.0001 
[0.9912] 
0.0384 
[0.8452] 
0.0246 
[0.8758] 
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Table 2 (continued) 
 Mean Median Winsorised 
mean 
Trimmed 
mean 
Panel B: Developing countries 
Low debt 4.6551  
(18.0374) 
4.6614 
(16.3237) 
4.6068 
(17.3746) 
4.6181 
(17.3359) 
Lower middle debt 4.1270 
(12.3375) 
4.4003 
(15.9249) 
4.2491 
(14.5449) 
4.2931 
(14.9516) 
Upper middle debt 3.7266 
(16.7390) 
4.1295 
(20.3492) 
3.9579 
(20.4368) 
4.0231 
(21.3339) 
High debt 3.3153  
(9.5707) 
3.5916 
(12.2024) 
3.6310 
(12.6316) 
3.6214 
(12.6342) 
Low vs Lower middle 
debt  
1.5622 
[0.2151] 
0.4323 
[0.5127] 
0.8202 
[0.3677] 
0.6869 
[0.4096] 
Low vs Upper middle 
debt  
7.4214* 
[0.0079] 
2.3057 
[0.1327] 
3.9060** 
[0.0515] 
3.3235*** 
[0.0719] 
Low vs High debt  9.6191* 
[0.0027] 
6.7987* 
[0.0108] 
6.2134* 
[0.0147] 
6.4748* 
[0.0128] 
Lower middle vs 
Upper middle debt  
0.9932 
[0.3223] 
0.6192 
[0.4336] 
0.6901 
[0.4089] 
0.6180 
[0.4344] 
Lower middle vs High 
debt  
2.8411*** 
[0.0956] 
4.0122** 
[0.0484] 
2.2745 
[0.1353] 
2.7415*** 
[0.1015] 
Upper middle vs High 
debt  
0.9974 
[0.3213] 
2.2636 
[0.1367] 
0.8817 
[0.3505] 
1.3708 
[0.2455] 
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Table 2 (continued) 
 Mean Median Winsorised 
mean 
Trimmed 
mean 
Panel C: Countries in transition 
Low debt 3.4221 
(3.1473) 
3.4922 
(3.1198) 
3.4923 
(3.1202) 
3.4907 
(3.1201) 
Lower middle debt 1.8120 
(1.6134) 
2.0248 
(1.9689) 
1.9526 
(1.8964) 
1.9647 
(1.9093) 
Upper middle debt 4.2015 
(3.0205) 
4.0230 
(2.7665) 
4.0230 
(2.7665) 
4.0230 
(2.7665) 
High debt 0.8985 
(1.0117) 
1.2785 
(1.4858) 
1.2785 
(1.4858) 
1.2785 
(1.4858) 
Low vs Lower middle 
debt  
1.0590 
[0.3096] 
0.9191 
[0.3438] 
1.0111 
[0.3210] 
0.9942 
[0.3250] 
Low vs Upper middle 
debt  
0.2002 
[0.6574] 
0.0864 
[0.7706] 
0.0863 
[0.7707] 
0.0869 
[0.7699] 
Low vs High debt  3.2584*** 
[0.0784] 
2.4862 
[0.1225] 
2.4868 
[0.1225] 
2.4844 
[0.1227] 
Lower middle vs 
Upper middle debt  
1.8283 
[0.1858] 
1.3291 
[0.2575] 
1.4253 
[0.2413] 
1.4096 
[0.2439] 
Lower middle vs 
High debt   
0.4169 
[0.5223] 
0.3147 
[0.5780] 
0.2565 
[0.6154] 
0.2659 
[0.6090] 
Upper middle vs High 
debt   
4.4185** 
[0.0428] 
2.9910*** 
[0.0925] 
2.9910*** 
[0.0925] 
2.9910*** 
[0.0925] 
Notes:  
In the ordinary brackets below the parameter estimates are the corresponding t-statistics 
based on Newey and West (1987) standard errors. 
XX vs. XX are equality tests. In the square brackets we report the associated p-values are 
given. *, ** and ***indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
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Table 3: Empirical results combining the World Bank’s classification with the 
IMF’s fine classification  
 Mean Median Winsorised 
mean 
Trimmed 
mean 
Panel A: European Union countries 
Low debt 3.0814 
(7.4421) 
3.0932 
(8.2429) 
3.1235 
(8.3579) 
3.1184 
(8.3442) 
Lower middle debt 3.0988 
(6.9873) 
3.0282 
(8.3508) 
3.0672 
(8.2148) 
3.0559 
(8.2576) 
Upper middle debt 2.7619 
(5.2629) 
2.5456 
(4.9914) 
2.5334 
(4.9228) 
2.5349 
(4.9361) 
High debt 2.9603 
(7.5733) 
2.6033 
(7.7654) 
2.6181 
(7.8256) 
2.6157 
(7.8166) 
Low vs Lower middle 
debt   
0.0008 
[0.9771] 
0.0155 
[0.9013] 
0.0114 
[0.9154] 
0.0141 
[0.9056] 
Low vs Upper middle 
debt   
0.2285 
[0.6340] 
0.7510 
[0.3890] 
0.8608 
[0.3565] 
0.8441 
[0.3612] 
Low vs High debt  0.0452 
[0.8322] 
0.9479 
[0.3331] 
1.0151 
[0.3167] 
1.0045 
[0.3192] 
Lower middle vs 
Upper middle debt  
0.2405 
[0.6252] 
0.5976 
[0.4420] 
0.7048 
[0.4039] 
0.6774 
[0.4131] 
Lower middle vs High 
debt  
0.0549 
[0.8153] 
0.7405 
[0.3920] 
0.8024 
[0.3730] 
0.7785 
[0.3802] 
Upper middle vs High 
debt  
0.0920 
[0.7625] 
0.0092 
[0.9236] 
0.0190 
[0.8906] 
0.0174 
[0.8955] 
 
28 
 
Table 3 (continued) 
 Mean Median Winsorised 
mean 
Trimmed 
mean 
Panel B: Newly Industrialized Asian countries 
Low debt 2.7385 
(1.1874) 
2.7385 
(1.1874) 
2.7385 
(1.1874) 
2.7385 
(1.1874) 
Lower middle debt 5.7534 
(4.7029) 
5.7534 
(4.7029) 
5.7534 
(4.7029) 
5.7534 
(4.7029) 
Upper middle debt 8.7281 
(6.7907) 
8.7281 
(6.7907) 
8.7281 
(6.7907) 
8.7281 
(6.7907) 
High debt 6.9251 
(9.4516) 
6.9251 
(9.4516) 
6.9251 
(9.4516) 
6.9251 
(9.4516) 
Low vs Lower middle 
debt  
1.3337 
[0.3050] 
1.3337 
[0.3050] 
1.3337 
[0.3050] 
1.3337 
[0.3050] 
Low vs Upper middle 
debt  
5.1463*** 
[0.0725] 
5.1463*** 
[0.0725] 
5.1463*** 
[0.0725] 
5.1463*** 
[0.0725] 
Low vs High debt  2.9933 
[0.1659] 
2.9933 
[0.1659] 
2.9933 
[0.1659] 
2.9933 
[0.1659] 
Lower middle vs 
Upper middle debt  
2.8103 
[0.1255] 
2.8103 
[0.1255] 
2.8103 
[0.1255] 
2.8103 
[0.1255] 
Lower middle vs 
High debt  
0.6752 
[0.4456] 
0.6752 
[0.4456] 
0.6752 
[0.4456] 
0.6752 
[0.4456] 
Upper middle vs High 
debt  
1.4851 
[0.2397] 
1.4851 
[0.2397] 
1.4851 
[0.2397] 
1.4851 
[0.2397] 
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Table 3 (continued) 
 Mean Median Winsorised 
mean 
Trimmed 
mean 
Panel C: Other advanced economies  
Low debt 2.5783 
(10.3996) 
2.6217 
(9.5068) 
2.6197 
(9.5038) 
2.6200 
(9.5044) 
Lower middle debt 3.8007 
(8.0137) 
3.8228 
(8.0416) 
3.8228 
(8.0416) 
3.8228 
(8.0416) 
Upper middle debt 3.0945 
(12.5858) 
3.1264 
(12.3097) 
3.1264 
(12.3097) 
3.1264 
(12.3097) 
High debt 2.2310 
(5.6944) 
2.1835 
(5.0153) 
2.1835 
(5.0153) 
2.1835 
(5.0153) 
Low vs Lower middle 
debt  
4.8727** 
[0.0306] 
4.4963** 
[0.0375] 
4.5116** 
[0.0372] 
4.5091** 
[0.0373] 
Low vs Upper middle 
debt  
2.1852 
[0.1437] 
1.8128 
[0.1825] 
1.8276 
[0.1807] 
1.8552 
[0.1810] 
Low vs High debt  0.5681 
[0.4537] 
0.7318 
[0.3954] 
0.7255 
[0.3975] 
0.7266 
[0.3971] 
Lower middle vs 
Upper middle debt  
1.8233 
[0.1809] 
1.7387 
[0.1912] 
1.7387 
[0.1912] 
1.7387 
[0.1912] 
Lower middle vs 
High debt   
6.5109** 
[0.0130] 
6.4667** 
[0.0132] 
6.4667** 
[0.0132] 
6.4667** 
[0.0132] 
Upper middle vs High 
debt   
3.7566*** 
[0.0565] 
3.8251*** 
[0.0544] 
3.8251*** 
[0.0544] 
3.8251*** 
[0.0544] 
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Table 3 (continued) 
 Mean Median Winsorised 
mean 
Trimmed 
mean 
Panel D: Sub-Sahara countries  
Low debt 3.7538 
(4.2876) 
3.8775 
(4.3587) 
3.7538 
(4.2876) 
3.7538 
(4.2876) 
Lower middle debt 3.7092 
(5.0903) 
3.6940 
(5.5945) 
3.6874 
(5.5771) 
3.6890 
(5.5816) 
Upper middle debt 2.8099 
(6.6820) 
3.2769 
(8.3498) 
3.1417 
(7.5963) 
3.1596 
(7.6927) 
High debt 2.2108 
(4.0800) 
2.7079 
(5.2240) 
2.6612 
(5.1964) 
2.6730 
(5.2167) 
Low vs Lower middle 
debt  
0.0015 
[0.9688] 
0.0272 
[0.8694] 
0.0036 
[0.9521] 
0.0035 
[0.9533] 
Low vs Upper middle 
debt  
0.9904 
[0.3228] 
0.4017 
[0.5281] 
0.4194 
[0.5192] 
0.3964 
[0.5309] 
Low vs High debt  2.3810 
[0.1269] 
1.3786 
[0.2439] 
1.2391 
[0.2691] 
1.2119 
[0.2743] 
Lower middle vs 
Upper middle debt  
1.2000 
[0.2769] 
0.3089 
[0.5800] 
0.5106 
[0.4771] 
0.4831 
[0.4892] 
Lower middle vs High 
debt   
2.7229 
[0.1036] 
1.3800 
[0.2441] 
1.5512 
[0.2167] 
1.4761 
[0.2285] 
Upper middle vs High 
debt   
0.7630 
[0.3851] 
0.7488 
[0.3894] 
0.5235 
[0.4714] 
0.5490 
[0.4609] 
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Table 3 (continued) 
 Mean Median Winsorised 
mean 
Trimmed 
mean 
Panel E: North Africa countries  
Low debt 3.0334 
(4.5096) 
3.0334 
(4.5096) 
3.0334 
(4.5096) 
3.0334 
(4.5096) 
Lower middle debt 5.5785 
(6.2961) 
5.5785 
(6.2961) 
5.5785 
(6.2961) 
5.5785 
(6.2961) 
Upper middle debt 4.1497 
(10.2398) 
4.1497 
(10.2398) 
4.1497 
(10.2398) 
4.1497 
(10.2398) 
High debt 4.1641 
(5.2790) 
4.1438 
(5.2643) 
4.1438 
(5.3643) 
4.1438 
(5.3643) 
Low vs Lower middle 
debt  
5.2346** 
[0.0413] 
5.2346** 
[0.0413] 
5.2346** 
[0.0413] 
5.2346** 
[0.0413] 
Low vs Upper middle 
debt  
2.0210 
[0.1885] 
2.0210 
[0.1885] 
2.0210 
[0.1885] 
2.0210 
[0.1885] 
Low vs High debt  0.3582 
[0.5532] 
0.3468 
[0.5595] 
0.3468 
[0.5595] 
0.3468 
[0.5595] 
Lower middle vs 
Upper middle debt  
2.1505 
[0.1728] 
2.1505 
[0.1728] 
2.1505 
[0.1728] 
2.1505 
[0.1728] 
Lower middle vs High 
debt   
1.4216 
[0.2473] 
1.4655 
[0.2404] 
1.4655 
[0.2404] 
1.4655 
[0.2404] 
Upper middle vs High 
debt   
0.0003 
[0.9871] 
4.58E-05 
[0.9946] 
4.58E-05 
[0.9946] 
4.58E-05 
[0.9946] 
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Table 3 (continued) 
 Mean Median Winsorised 
mean 
Trimmed 
mean 
Panel F: Asian developing countries  
Low debt 7.5282 
(17.6950) 
7.5145 
(18.2266) 
7.5166 
(18.3722) 
7.5171 
(18.3679) 
Lower middle debt 5.3228 
(14.7722) 
5.5518 
(16.8010) 
5.5647 
(16.9130) 
5.5626 
(16.8960) 
Upper middle debt 5.6689 
(12.8615) 
5.8066 
(13.5856) 
5.8066 
(13.5856) 
5.8066 
(13.5856) 
High debt 4.8964 
(10.7893) 
4.8149 
(11.2819) 
4.8149 
(11.2819) 
4.8149 
(11.2819) 
Low vs Lower middle 
debt  
15.6463* 
[0.0002] 
13.7993* 
[0.0004] 
13.8218* 
[0.0004] 
13.8474* 
[0.0004] 
Low vs Upper middle 
debt  
9.2111* 
[0.0034] 
8.2710* 
[0.0053] 
8.3530* 
[0.0051] 
8.3552* 
[0.0051] 
Low vs High debt  17.8992* 
[0.0001] 
20.6968* 
[0.0000] 
20.8831* 
[0.0000] 
20.8844* 
[0.0000] 
Lower middle vs 
Upper middle debt  
0.3696 
[0.5452] 
0.2226 
[0.6386] 
0.2011 
[0.6553] 
0.2046 
[0.6525] 
Lower middle vs 
High debt   
0.5416 
[0.4644] 
1.8636 
[0.1769] 
1.9361 
[0.1688] 
1.9241 
[0.1702] 
Upper middle vs High 
debt   
1.4912 
[0.2263] 
2.6958*** 
[0.1053] 
2.6958*** 
[0.1053] 
2.6958*** 
[0.1053] 
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Table 3 (continued) 
 Mean Median Winsorised 
mean 
Trimmed 
mean 
Panel G: Middle East and Europe countries  
Low debt 3.4442 
(6.1006) 
3.4442 
(6.1006) 
3.4442 
(6.1006) 
3.4442 
(6.1006) 
Lower middle debt 4.4007 
(5.3629) 
4.4007 
(5.3629) 
4.4007 
(5.3629) 
4.4007 
(5.3629) 
Upper middle debt 4.4576 
(5.2989) 
4.4576 
(5.2989) 
4.4576 
(5.2989) 
4.4576 
(5.2989) 
High debt 6.1253 
(8.5602) 
6.2254 
(8.6686) 
6.2254 
(8.6686) 
6.2254 
(8.6686) 
Low vs Lower middle 
debt  
0.9221 
[0.3448] 
0.9221 
[0.3448] 
0.9221 
[0.3448] 
0.9221 
[0.3448] 
Low vs Upper middle 
debt  
1.0006 
[0.3256] 
1.0006 
[0.3256] 
1.0006 
[0.3256] 
1.0006 
[0.3256] 
Low vs High debt  8.6528* 
[0.0048] 
9.2694* 
[0.0036] 
9.2694* 
[0.0036] 
9.2694* 
[0.0036] 
Lower middle vs 
Upper middle debt  
0.0023 
[0.9617] 
0.0023 
[0.9617] 
0.0023 
[0.9617] 
0.0023 
[0.9617] 
Lower middle vs 
High debt   
2.5092 
[0.1221] 
2.8002*** 
[0.1030] 
2.8002*** 
[0.1030] 
2.8002*** 
[0.1030] 
Upper middle vs High 
debt   
2.2802 
[0.1401] 
2.5543 
[0.1190] 
2.5543 
[0.1190] 
2.5543 
[0.1190] 
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Table 3 (continued) 
 Mean Median Winsorised 
mean 
Trimmed 
mean 
Panel H: Western Hemisphere developing countries  
Low debt 3.7863 
(10.3439) 
3.7843 
(11.2856) 
3.7874 
(11.6109) 
3.7859 
(11.6206) 
Lower middle debt 3.6064 
(7.5951) 
3.7555 
(8.6108) 
3.6670 
(8.5084) 
3.6700 
(8.5339) 
Upper middle debt 3.6074 
(9.5715) 
3.6619 
(9.8949) 
3.5923 
(9.7333) 
3.6039 
(9.8684) 
High debt 2.6413 
(4.8979) 
2.5796 
(5.1594) 
2.5542 
(5.0335) 
2.5652 
(5.0850) 
Low vs Lower middle 
debt  
0.0888 
[0.7665] 
0.0027 
[0.9587] 
0.0489 
[0.8256] 
0.0455 
[0.8316] 
Low vs Upper middle 
debt  
0.1159 
[0.7344] 
0.0601 
[0.8070] 
0.1570 
[0.6930] 
0.1383 
[0.7110] 
Low vs High debt  3.0862*** 
[0.0832] 
3.9663** 
[0.0498] 
4.1789** 
[0.0447] 
4.1318** 
[0.0459] 
Lower middle vs 
Upper middle debt  
2.6E-06 
[0.9987] 
0.0268 
[0.8704] 
0.0174 
[0.8955] 
0.0137 
[0.9070] 
Lower middle vs 
High debt   
1.8042 
[0.1829] 
3.1411*** 
[0.0801] 
2.7938*** 
[0.0985] 
2.7775*** 
[0.0995] 
Upper middle vs High 
debt   
2.1563 
[0.1463] 
3.0271*** 
[0.0860] 
2.7368*** 
[0.1022] 
2.7812*** 
[0.0996] 
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Table 3 (continued) 
 Mean Median Winsorised 
mean 
Trimmed 
mean 
Panel I: Central and Eastern Europe countries  
Low debt 2.2049 
(1.5204) 
2.6040 
(1.7897) 
2.5390 
(1.7621) 
2.5510 
(1.7679) 
Lower middle debt 0.9039 
(0.6149) 
0.9065 
(0.6164) 
0.9065 
(0.6164) 
0.9065 
(0.6164) 
Upper middle debt 0.8326 
(0.3934) 
0.8326 
(0.3934) 
0.8326 
(0.3934) 
0.8326 
(0.3934) 
High debt 0.9111 
(1.0437) 
1.0988 
(1.2776) 
1.0988 
(1.2776) 
1.0988 
(1.2776) 
Low vs Lower middle 
debt  
0.3969 
[0.5330] 
0.6733 
[0.4178] 
0.6287 
[0.4335] 
0.6371 
[0.4305] 
Low vs Upper middle 
debt  
0.2861 
[0.6069] 
0.4758 
[0.5093] 
0.4442 
[0.5235] 
0.4501 
[0.5208] 
Low vs High debt  0.5842 
[0.4510] 
0.7931 
[0.3807] 
0.7366 
[0.3979] 
0.7473 
[0.3946] 
Lower middle vs 
Upper middle debt  
0.0007 
[0.9786] 
0.0008 
[0.9778] 
0.0008 
[0.9778] 
0.0008 
[0.9778] 
Lower middle vs High 
debt   
1.96E-05 
[0.9965] 
0.0141 
[0.9061] 
0.0141 
[0.9061] 
0.0141 
[0.9061] 
Upper middle vs High 
debt   
0.0012 
[0.9739] 
0.0136 
[0.9114] 
0.0136 
[0.9114] 
0.0136 
[0.9114] 
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Table 3 (continued) 
 Mean Median Winsorised 
mean 
Trimmed 
mean 
Panel J: Transcaucasus and Central Asia countries  
Low debt 4.8734 
(2.8782) 
4.8734 
(2.8782) 
4.8734 
(2.8782) 
4.8734 
(2.8782) 
Lower middle debt 4.8458 
(4.2168) 
4.8149 
(4.2156) 
4.8149 
(4.2156) 
4.8149 
(4.2156) 
Upper middle debt 6.0267 
(5.3240) 
6.0267 
(5.3240) 
6.0267 
(5.3240) 
6.0267 
(5.3240) 
High debt 3.7348 
(3.9114) 
3.7348 
(3.9114) 
3.7348 
(3.9114) 
3.7348 
(3.9114) 
Low vs Lower middle 
debt  
0.0007 
[0.9786] 
0.0007 
[0.9786] 
0.0007 
[0.9786] 
0.0007 
[0.9786] 
Low vs Upper middle 
debt  
0.2727 
[0.6063] 
0.2727 
[0.6063] 
0.2727 
[0.6063] 
0.2727 
[0.6063] 
Low vs High debt  0.0854 
[0.7739] 
0.0854 
[0.7739] 
0.0854 
[0.7739] 
0.0854 
[0.7739] 
Lower middle vs 
Upper middle debt  
0.5644 
[0.4598] 
0.5679 
[0.4595] 
0.5679 
[0.4595] 
0.5679 
[0.4595] 
Lower middle vs High 
debt   
0.5273 
[0.4870] 
0.5264 
[0.4874] 
0.5264 
[0.4874] 
0.5264 
[0.4874] 
Upper middle vs High 
debt   
2.3952 
[0.1590] 
2.3952 
[0.1590] 
2.3952 
[0.1590] 
2.3952 
[0.1590] 
Notes:  
In the ordinary brackets below the parameter estimates are the corresponding t-statistics 
based on Newey and West (1987) standard errors. 
XX vs. XX are equality tests.  
In the square brackets we report the associated p-values are given. *, ** and ***indicate 
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
 
 
 
 
